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In “Yesterday’s Child,” Rob Sparrow argues that genetically enhanced 
children will be considered to be obsolescent when the next improvement in 
genetic technology occurs, and that this will have negative effects on what 
we consider a human being to be.  I offer a few friendly amendments to 
Sparrow’s persuasive analysis.  Since Sparrow acknowledges that he is 
making empirical sociological predictions, I place Sparrow’s argument into a 
larger family of empirical claims that genetic technology will transform 
society’s conception of what humans are  (Evans 2016; Kaye 1997), and fill 
in details about how that literature would describe Sparrow’s mechanisms.
DEPENDENCE ON EMPIRICAL CLAIMS
The ethical literature about human enhancements, like any ethical 
literature about technologies that are not yet available, is very dependent 
upon a probabilistic predictive sociology of how people in the future will react
to technology.  This is inevitable and necessary.  Sparrow recognizes that his
questions are ultimately empirical claims about what society will do in the 
face of technology, and that more definitive social science research would 
require the phenomena to actually be occurring.  But, given that we cannot 
wait, we have no choice but to engage in probabilistic predictions of what the
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social implications of technology would be.  Sparrow’s argument is in a 
family of implicitly empirical claims about the impact of human technology 
on what humans will perceive themselves to be.  
INDIVIDUAL VS. CULTURAL IMPACTS
When identifying how genetic enhancement will lead to changing how 
people are perceived, it is important to explicitly distinguish two levels in 
Sparrow’s analysis – the individual and the cultural.  Individual level claims in
the sections of the paper titled “feeling obsolete,” and “being seen as 
obsolete,” include whether an enhanced individual will be treated differently 
by their parents, discriminated against in the workplace, whether the 
enhanced individuals will be stigmatized or lauded.  These are relatively easy
to operationalize into social science research, and their individualist focus 
makes them an easy fit with the profession of bioethics, as well as public 
policy and law, all of which prefer to describe ethics as conflicts between 
individuals  (Evans 2012). 
But, these are not the most important questions.  Sparrow is more 
interested in the deeper cultural level, which is not whether an individual will
be treated differently, but whether human culture will be transformed so that
humans – enhanced or un-enhanced – are all thought of differently.  He is 
concerned about the “transformation of human nature such that human 
beings would become ‘products’” (p.19).  He also writes that “Enhancement 
would transform our understanding of what it means to be human such that 
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we would come to understand ourselves as – indeed, in an important sense 
to be – manufactured things to be improved upon in future iterations.” (P.21-
22) This is a cultural change, so whether any human is actually enhanced is 
not relevant, and all that is important is that we think some humans are 
enhanced.  As the nearly 100 year old sociological adage states: if people 
“define situations as real, they are real in their consequences.”  (Thomas and
Thomas 1928:571-72)
THE CONCERN IN THE LITERATURE
Sparrow’s article is a part of the literature about how enhancement 
would change our perceptions of ourselves, which was one of the original 
post-reform eugenics debates about human genetic engineering in the 1960s
(Evans 2002).  He cites C.S. Lewis and Hans Jonas – canonical authors in that 
era of debate.  But Sparrow leaves the typical punch line in this literature 
implicit, which is that if humans are thought of as more like objects we will 
treat them as such  (Bain, Vaes and Leyens 2014)  For example, nations at 
war define their enemy as animals (“vermin”) or objects (“logs of wood”) 
which makes it easier to kill  (Keen 1986), a literal “de-humanization” at the 
hands of government propaganda.  Therefore, to tie it all together, the 
concern in this literature is that if we engage in human genetic 
enhancement, we will ever so slightly think of all humans as more like 
objects, and ever so slightly treat humans worse than we otherwise would.  
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In other terms, this is not the dehumanization of any one enhanced 
individual, but of humanity writ-large.
SPARROW’S OBJECTIFICATION MECHANISMS
Filling in the details of Sparrow’s mechanism from the social science 
literature, the objectification of humanity would occur when people become 
aware of parents’ motivation for enhancing their children, which reveals a 
ranking of capacities.  The strength of the idea that humans should be 
ranked is reinforced as new “improved” capacities for humans become 
available, which emphasizes that the new capacities are better than 
obsolescent ones.  Since “obsolescence is something that happens to things 
not people,” thinking that some humans are obsolescent will make us think 
of them as more object-like and by extension that all people are more object 
like.  Similarly, he writes that a unidimensional value ranking of people will 
develop, which homogenizes social experience.  Only objects have unitary 
purposes, so this will also make humans become seen as even more object-
like.  Identifying obsolescence as an intensifier of this social mechanism is an
important contribution to this literature.
EXISTING DATA
I believe that mechanisms identified by Sparrow and others for how 
genetic enhancement would make all humans appear to be more object-like 
are empirically plausible.  I have some data on his specific ranking 
mechanism.  I conducted a research project that measured the conceptions 
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of a human that the public actually holds (what Sparrow calls ontologies) in 
relationship to questions about biotechnology and whether those are linked 
with treating people more like objects.  (Evans 2016) 
My analysis of the same ethical literature that Sparrow is engaged 
with, and including his earlier writing, led me to look for three versions of the
human possibly held by the public.  The first is the Jewish and Christian idea 
that a human is that which is made in the image of God.  The second is that 
a human is that with a particular genetic code.
I focus here on the third, which is that a human is defined by having a 
particular set of capacities like capacity for rational thought, self-
consciousness, moral agency and so on.  Critics of the capacities definition 
are concerned that such a view instantiated in living wills, discussions of the 
personhood of chimpanzees, the status of coma patients and much else is 
teaching the public that we are defined by our capacities and, critically, that 
a human has more value if they have more of these capacities.  The object 
lesson for this effect was the eugenics movement where humans with certain
capacities were thought to have more inherent value than others.  The 
reader should recognize that this is the same ranking mechanism 
hypothesized by Sparrow.
I conducted in-depth interviews of a pseudo-representative sample of 
51 ordinary Americans and an over 3500-respondent nationally-
representative public opinion survey.  Limiting myself to the more easy to 
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explain survey results, I found that the more a respondent agreed with the 
capacities definition, the less likely they were to agree that people with 
“lesser” abilities had the same general value as those with “better” abilities.1
More importantly, the less a respondent thought that all humans had equal 
value, the more likely they were to agree with buying kidneys from poor 
people, that sick people should commit suicide to save money for their 
families, with taking blood from prisoners without their permission; and 
torturing people to try to save others.  (Evans 2016:60-65) And, to finish the 
loop, the more strongly someone agreed with the capacities definition of the 
human, the less likely they were to agree that militaries should stop 
genocides and the more likely to agree with buying a kidney from a poor 
person, that people should commit suicide to save money and to torture 
people to try to save others’ lives.  I portray these positions as treating 
people like objects, but I recognize that they are also the positions often 
taken by utilitarians.  For nuance, see the book.
I would be the first to say that my earlier research is not the final word 
on this topic and indeed, as Sparrow points out, we really cannot get a 
definitive conclusion until the technology starts being used and the 
1 “What is the general value of people with better abilities compared to
those with lesser abilities?”  Would you say the people with better abilities 
have: Much more value, more value, the same value, less value, or much 
less value?”
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hypothesized effects begin to happen.  But, I think my research generally 
supports Sparrow’s hypothesis, and he is therefore right to be concerned.
Debates in public bioethical debate that concern future technologies 
typically rely upon implicit empirical predictions about societal reactions.  We
cannot wait for the technologies to be developed to try to make these 
empirical predictions, and they can be done in a probabilistic manner.  
Philosophers also cannot wait for social scientists to conduct all of the 
studies that are needed, so I encourage everyone to use as much of the 
extensive data on our contemporary society as they can to make reasonable 
predictions about the future.  
I finish with noting that the lack of data for implicitly empirical claims is
not only the province of those concerned about future technologies.  Rather, 
those who Erik Parens calls “enthusiasts”  (Parens 2015)are perhaps even 
more fact free when they, for example, just assume without data that 
somehow greater intelligence is good for individuals and for society  
(Hauskeller 2013:13-21).  Social science data on the nature of present social 
structures, and their durability, would inform all sides of this debate.
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